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Abstract 
 Highly complex bespoke engineering products require upgrades 
during their long service life.  These engineering changes can be risky due to 
the absence of an engineering baseline and/or multiple undocumented 
operational changes.  They present significant challenges to the engineering 
contractor in terms of budget overruns, schedule impacts/delays, technical 
failures and ultimately a disappointed customer. Current risk management 
methods can be subjective and inaccurate.  This paper outlines methodology 
to potentially predict, identify and visualize risks in a strategic structure 
which can ultimately lead to establishing necessary risk mitigation actions to 
significantly reduce and manage the risk of complex engineering system 
upgrade projects. 
 
Keywords: Mid-life upgrade, risk modelling, capability framework, 
complex engineering project, risk visualisation 
 
Introduction 
 Highly complex platform systems such as ships, land vehicles and 
aircraft often require modifications and upgrades to some areas of the system 
during their long service life [1].  These engineering change projects are 
inherently ill-informed due to the absence of an engineering baseline and 
undocumented operational changes.  Many of the decisions taken both at the 
early stages and throughout large scale engineering projects are injudicious 
due to poor understanding of key risks and their consequences. This leads to 
budget overruns, schedule impacts/delays, technical failures and ultimately a 
disappointed customer [2]. In order to develop a sound strategy when 
undertaking complex projects, engineering organisations need to fully 
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understand what their risk profile is, so they can manage, mitigate or even in 
some cases decline the task completely. 
 One of the critical issues in risk management is the perceived 
subjectivity of the risk assessment by specific personnel, for example, those 
who are actually working on the project, as compared to those who are 
related and may have a different set of imperatives to the work.  A process 
that can eliminate as much as possible the subjectivity in both the evaluation 
stage as well as the data collection would minimize the hazard of 
inappropriate decisions being made on incorrect information and perception 
[5]. 
 It is clear that an analysis tool that will allow an organisation to better 
understand the risks in a new project prior to and at early stages of the 
project is desirable.  This tool should be supported by a risk model that is 
built on a comprehensive project enterprise model and be able to create a risk 
profile quantitatively.  This paper outlines the methodology for conducting 
risk analysis into complex engineering projects and developing a potential 
risk model.  The study has been initiated under the Engineering Support 
Services requirements within the Australian Naval Maritime environment, 
but it could equally be applied to other countries, industries and disciplines.   
 
Literature Review 
 In a large engineering project the chief element of risk arises from the 
fact that there are many variables that influence and determine the final cost 
and duration of the project. Every step of the process is laden with risk. 
Traditionally, for large scale engineering projects, the focus is on reliability, 
availability, maintainability and supportability (RAMS).  Barabadi et al [3] 
claimed that product issues and failures could be reduced and their 
consequences minimized by the use of tools such as failure mode and effects 
and critical analysis (FMECA), fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree 
analysis (ETA).  These are good methods of representing the performance of 
an engineering system by a quantitative value which can be linked to risks. 
Markeset and Kumar [4] proposed the idea of the gate model.  By passing 
through checks or gates, and ensuring the tasks were evaluated, the project 
risks should be better controlled and reduced. 
 In an alliance, as the different players begin to assess their contractual 
duties, they try to reallocate risks to the next party. Abi-Karam [6] focused 
on design-build in construction projects and identified the risks in the 
proposal, pricing, project schedule, performance measures, contractual 
liability and safety areas.  These risks should be identified in detail and 
managed continuously even beyond project completion. 
 Modarres [7] went further to identify, rank and predict contributors to 
risk.  Modarres calculated probabilistic risk for different scenarios and some 
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interesting methods of presenting risk in graphical forms.  This work 
illustrated ways of quantifying risks and hence the possibility of ranking 
accordingly.  Ayyub [8] used a number of real life examples and the method 
used explained. While they are not completely relevant to this research 
project, they do offer ways of being manipulated or partially used to achieve 
my required outcomes. These methods were useful for specific cases but 
were limited in scope for application to large scale engineering projects.  
Claypool et al [9] reviewed some basic risk management techniques that had 
been used for years. However, after conducting surveys with 110 managers 
they believed there was much room for improvement.  They highlighted that 
little work was conducted in reducing risk in the supply chain which large 
scale engineering projects would depend heavily upon.  The authors went on 
to offer several methods of evaluating a supply chain mainly through surveys 
and analysis. 
 Mo [10] studied systems that were designed to support assets in 
service.  The method was based on categorization of capabilities into six 
elements as shown in Figure 1.  Through a simple modelling process 
including both cost and availability, the performance of a service system can 
be estimated.  This model appeared to be somewhat relevant to the analysis 
of risk in complex engineering system upgrade projects by calculating 
indicators of where a company should increase capacity, effort and 
expenditure to reduce or mitigate risk.  
 
Figure 5 - Capabilities of service systems 
 
 With a similar approach, Yim et al [11] developed an interesting 
methodology for obtaining data and illustrated how they could relate to 
different complexities of engineering projects.  The methodology was to 
enable project managers to identify risk indicators early in the lifecycle of a 
project according to complexity of the project and to subsequently initiate 
effective mitigation.  Cohn [12] offered a commercial software that 
calculated risk in the form of a risk burndown chart as shown in Figure 2. 
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Essentially the chart is built from the probability of risk, size of loss in days 
which gives the number of days’ exposure to risk. The chart is created by 
plotting the sum of the risk exposure values. 
 
Figure 6 - Risk brundown chart 
 
 The risk burndown chart would be an ideal tool for visualizing how 
different strategies in the allocation of resources, financial investment, cash 
flow etc could affect risks. However, the risk assessment method is 
subjective and the outcome can vary greatly among different groups.  The 
value of any risk model will only be perceived as useful if it successfully 
highlights key risks from quantitative data, offers ways to improve/mitigate 
the risks identified and is relatively simple and straightforward to apply. 
While many organisations already attend to highlighting potential risks with 
an array of tools, software and/or methods, their calibre is often diminished 
by over-complexity and convoluted processes that are too involved. 
 
Industry Perspective 
 To understand the value of the proposed risk analysis/model, it is 
important to develop an understanding of both the organisation being studied 
and how the business currently manages risk, and the tools and processes 
that are used.   
 The activity of UK defence organisation BAE Systems in the 
Australian marketplace can be traced back to 1961 when the British Aircraft 
Corporation (Australia) was formed. The business underwent a name change 
in 1977 when it became British Aerospace Australia. Over the next two 
decades the business acquired a number of additional companies as it grew 
and secured its reputation within Australia. In 2008 the company more than 
doubled its size with the acquisition of Tenix Defence, a privately owned 
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business involved primarily in naval contracts. Since then BAE Systems1 has 
gone from strength to strength and is now the largest defence contractor 
within Australia. 
 Due to the nature of business, BAE Systems needs to develop risk 
management tools that provides accurate assessment of the merits and 
pitfalls in their bids and projects, under the constraints of the organisation’s 
characteristics.  Through its lifecycle management strategy, BAE Systems 
Australia operates a Risk and Opportunity Management Plan (ROMP) for 
business units, projects and functions.  The purpose of the ROMP is to: 
• Describe the methodology for clear and continual identification, 
assessment, development, and monitoring of treatment/promotion plans for 
R&Os; 
• Increase the chance of achieving the Project objectives by facilitating 
improved decision making based on effective insight into the risks and their 
associated impacts; and 
• Maximise Project performance in terms of the achievement of scope, 
time, cost and quality objectives by assessing the risks. 
 The ROMP goes on to state benefits generated by the application of 
Risk Management include: 
• Identification of those risks that require management focus before 
potential negative impacts are manifested; 
• Enables the timely development of treatments to mitigate risks before 
they occur or reduce negative impacts if they occur;  
• Delivery of benefits achieved through the realisation of opportunities.  
Opportunities are considered potential commercial benefits to BAE Systems; 
and 
• The Risk and Opportunity Management Procedure is compliant with 
AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 [13] and is subordinate to the BU Project 
Management Plan. 
 The BAE Systems Maritime business unit separates risk into two 
categories.  The first relates to commercial and project risk.  The description 
of this risk is ‘an event that may occur causing a negative impact on project 
objectives, typically expressed in terms of cost, schedule and performance 
(quality and functionality) or a combination thereof’ (BAE Systems Risk 
handbook).  The second is described as technical risk and is defined as ‘an 
event, with a finite probability of occurrence, which could lead to an adverse 
impact on the technical objectives of a project’. Risks are managed through a 
process of identification, analysis, evaluation and mitigation which is defined 
in more detail in Figure 3. 
                                                          
1 The organisation became known globally to BAE Systems in 1999 with the merger 
of British Aerospace and Marconi Systems. 
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Figure 7 - BAE Systems risk process 
 
 The main tool used by BAE System Maritime for risk management is 
a risk register which is usually populated by project managers and engineers 
alike. The register is based on assessing risks against the 
likelihood/consequence ratings which are qualitatively defined typically by 
brainstorming and project meetings both internally and involving the 
customer and alliance partners. 
 When the risk register is populated with risk assessments on the 
severity/impact of the risk is judged using likelihood and consequence levels 
from AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 [13]. These likelihood and consequences 
values are used to generate potential cost implications of these risks and 
schedule implications. As part of the alliance these risks are flowed up to the 
System Programme Office (SPO) and eventually to the Commonwealth of 
Australia (CoA) where they are combined with risks from other aspects of 
the proposed change.   
 BAE Systems also uses some risk management software, but it is 
important to note that this is not generally used by project managers or 
engineers.  Both the risk register and the risk management software offer 
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sound methods of identifying risks, assessing their significance and financial 
and schedule implications. However, these tools are not easily maintained or 
updated as a project progresses and residual risks can in some cases fail to be 
properly managed resulting in serious financial and schedule impacts. This 
problem is compounded by the lack of ability to visualise the risk profile and 
monitor how it evolves through the project life cycle.  
 
Research Approach 
 This research aims to develop a tool that will allow an organisation to 
better understand the risks in a new project prior to and at the early stages of 
the project.  To support the tool, a risk model based on generic enterprise 
architecture framework is being developed to provide a risk profile 
quantitatively. By segmenting the enterprise into three major sectors, it is 
possible to identify and visualise specifically what are the key risk drivers 
and monitor them through the life of the project.   
 The approach taken for this research is primarily a staged process.  
This consisted of developing an understanding of the risks of conducting 
large scale system upgrade projects within the commercial sector, outcome 
based contractual environment involving key stakeholders in the defence 
industry and the government and a study to investigate the current thinking 
of risks and what contemporary methods, models and tools are used in this 
type of organisation.  Research was then conducted into the Australian Naval 
Maritime environment to develop a theoretical model which could 
ameliorate the current processes involved in understanding and managing 
risk throughout the project life cycle. 
 A survey focusing on three recent major engineering projects was 
used to assess the perception and experience of a variety of stakeholders 
involved in these projects while still fresh in their memories. The data 
generated from the risk survey was analyzed and presented by various 
methods to determine meaningful and useful results.  Visualisation tools 
were also employed to highlight, visualise, manage and control risk as a 
project progressed through the life cycle.  The outcomes of this analysis can 
then be used as a basis to plan necessary risk mitigation actions that can 
significantly reduce the risk of conducting complex engineering system 
projects. 
 The three projects detailed below have their own unique challenges 
and risks to overcome in order to achieve success. They have been chosen as 
sample projects for the risk modelling research conducted within this report, 
because they are well known within BAE Systems – Maritime, and familiar 
to the both the Project Management and Engineering Teams. They also offer 
a good delta in overall financial value and variation in the risk profile. 
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MH60R Project 
 The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ANZAC class of Frigates were 
originally designed for the operation of the Sikorsky S-70B-2 Seahawk 
helicopter. However, in June 2011, the Australian Government approved the 
acquisition of 24 MH-60R Seahawk ‘Romeo’ naval combat helicopters 
(Figure 4). The ‘Romeo’ helicopter was chosen because it represents the best 
value for money for taxpayers and was the lowest risk option [14]. 
 The acquisition means that Royal Australian Navy will have the 
capacity to provide at least eight RAN ANZAC class frigates with a combat 
helicopter at the same time. In order to safely operate the new helicopter 
from the ANZAC platform, a number of modifications to the ships are 
required. This has included: 
• Installation of new support equipment; 
• Changes to the configuration of the hangar and flight deck area; and 
• Installation of new landing and taking-off navigation equipment;  
 This project was successfully completed on the first RAN ANZAC 
ship in late 2014 with a successful landing of the MH60R helicopter being 
achieved in early 2015. This project is considered medium size and 
combined OEM equipment and BAE Systems design and installation. 
 
Figure 8 - MH60R helicopter 
 
A. 1448 4B Phase Array 
 In late 2005, the RAN ANZAC class frigate 1448 2B Anti-Ship 
Missile Defence (ASMD) programme commenced. This programme was 
tasked with delivering an increased defensive capability to the vessels, with 
the installation of a newly developed phased array radar (PAR) system for 
target indication/tracking and mid-course guidance and target illumination of 
the evolved anti-ship missiles in conjunction with other sensor and combat 
management system upgrades. Major changes to the ship included a new 
mast and cupola to house the PAR which was developed by CEA 
Technologies of Australia (Figure 5).  
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 During this programme, some of the highest risks related to the 
development by CEA Technologies of a cutting-edge phased array radar 
performance technology, or the product.  
 
Figure 9 - RAN ANZAC frigate with ASMD installation 
 
 In addition to the 1448 2B ASMD PAR programme, there is now a 
pressing need to replace the obsolete long range radar capability on the RAN 
ANZAC class frigates. Project SEA 1448 Phase 4B – ANZAC Air Search 
Radar Replacement has been commenced by the Australian Government. 
The RAN ANZAC frigates use their air search radar to scan at long ranges 
for potential threats. The radar is an integral part of a modern warship and 
important for ensuring the safety of the vessel and other friendly ships in 
dangerous areas. The current RAN ANZAC frigate radar is old and requires 
replacement with modern technology to maintain the robust front-line 
capability provided by these ships.  
 A risk reduction phase of implementing a new technology is currently 
underway and CEA Technologies are again being considered to design and 
develop a long range PAR which will most likely be installed on top of the 
extant ASMD mast. This is considered a major project, with significant risk 
surrounding the product or new PAR system.   
B. New Bilge Keel 
 Since inception, the RAN ANZAC class frigate has suffered from 
fatigue cracking of their bilge keels (Figure 6). The origins of the fault can 
potentially be linked to operating environments which have seen higher loads 
than originally design for. The primary function of the bilge keel is to 
stabilise the ship and reduce rolling, this is important for the performance of 
the vessel especially one that operates a helicopter.  
 BAE Systems - Maritime has been tasked with the design, 
manufacture and installation of a new bilge keel set for the RAN ANZAC 
class of frigates. The project is considered medium with risks surrounding 
the keel design and installation. 
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Figure 10 - Example of Bilge Keel on RAN ANZAC Frigate 
 
Modelling Principles 
 This research aims to remove the subjectivity of risk assessment and 
define a baseline or ‘Ideal’ project that is based on a 50% probability of 
success. Risk analysis can then be conducted on new projects in a similar 
manner and the results compared to this ‘Ideal’ project to assess what 
‘percentage of success’ is possible. This will subsequently allow an 
organisation to assess whether this risk profile is acceptable and what 
strategy/approach can be taken to improve the percentage of success if 
necessary. 
 In order to set some form of qualitative baseline which could then be 
used for both quantitative assessment and analysis, an investigation into risks 
surrounding complex engineering projects was undertaken as part of the 
research. The initial objective was to compile a list of risks and then 
categorize these into product, process and people (3P model). 
 The compiled risks were then analysed for repeats and commonality 
within each category. Over 150 risks were identified.  To help focus the 
research in developing quantification methodology, 10 risks from each of the 
3P categories was selected based on their generic nature and applicability to 
the majority of BAE Systems Maritime projects. 
 In order to ensure the survey participants were not either influenced 
or mislead by the identified risks, each of the 30 risks identified was 
reworded so they can be appropriately populated into the survey.  For each of 
the questions, it was necessary to establish a quantitative value which could 
be used for analysis purposes. To ensure that a good spread of data was 
achieved, a value or metric for each of question (risk) above was a score out 
of 1 to 10. 
Table 1 - Data analysis for three projects 
 MH60R 1448 4B NBK 
Product 
Mean 6.8143 7.5286 6.2714 
Std Dev. 2.3676 2.4800 6.5929 
Process 
Mean 6.5929 7.0214 6.6143 
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Std Dev. 2.5101 2.1707 2.4276 
People 
Mean 7.1786 7.6500 7.2714 
Std Dev. 2.2321 1.9413 2.0736 
3P combined 
Mean 6.8619 7.4000 6.7190 
Std Dev. 2.3727 2.2084 2.4488 
 
 To overcome the lack of a large data set and develop a model that 
could provide some useful/meaningful comparisons between the data, it was 
assumed that the data is normally distributed. For each of the three projects, 
the data was separated into the 3P model categories. The mean and standard 
deviation for each project was calculated and can be seen in Table 1. To 
visualize the effect of the data, a bell-curve for each of the 3P categories was 
generated as shown in Figure 7, Figure 8 and Figure 9.   
 
Figure 11 - Product results for three BAE Systems projects 
 
 
Figure 12 - Process results for three BAE Systems projects 
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Figure 13 - People results for three BAE Systems projects 
 A combined graph of the 3P distribution was also generated and is 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 14 - 3P model results for 3 BAE Systems projects 
 
 From the perceived understanding of the nature of the three projects 
within BAE Systems - Maritime, it is generally agreed that serious 
challenges relating to the 1448 4B project need to be overcome and it is 
considered a ‘risky’ project. MH60R has actually been completed and 
generally considered a success, while the bilge keel project is clear in scope 
and is found to sit somewhere between the two. 
 
Benchmark Model 
 In order to develop the risk model further, the idea of generating a 
percentage of success for a given project was explored. The hypothesis being 
that an ‘Ideal’ or ‘Perfect’ project, would have minimal risk that could be 
easily mitigated and has a percentage of success which can be established as 
the benchmark. Like the flip of a coin, there is a 50% chance it will be heads 
or tails, a project also has natural chance of 50% for success or failure. So if 
50% is as close to the ‘perfect’ project as it is possible to get, it stands to 
reason that the greater the delta from 50% a project sits, the less chance of 
success.  
 As previously mentioned, the MH60R project is considered a 
successful project. It can therefore be judged that its data results must in 
some way align towards an ‘Ideal’ project. The approach taken in this 
research is to assume that an ‘Ideal’ project would improve, for each 
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question, by one value (1 to 10) better than the MH60R data results (or 
10%).  The outcome of this calculation can be seen in the resulting graph in 
Figure 11.  It should be noted that other methods of setting the benchmark 
‘Ideal’ project can be used, for example, survey a special expert group or 
find the “best” project in BAE Systems.  However, in the context of this 
research, the outcome does not affect the methodology discussed in this 
paper. 
 
Figure 15 - Three BAE Systems Projects and predicted Ideal Project 
  
 As explained before, the ‘Ideal’ project would have a 50% chance for 
success. To define this percentage value to the risk model, the area under the 
graph of the ‘Idea’ project was established as the 50% success area, or the 
‘perfect success’ area, so the mean of this project was set as the 50% marker. 
The results of the calculation can be seen from the generated graph in Figure 
12.   
 
Figure 16 - Theoretical Area of Perfect Success (50%) 
 
 As a project moves away (to the right) of the ‘Ideal’ project, the 
chance of success begins to diminish because the area under the project 
curve that is sitting within the ‘Perfect Success’ area is reducing. 
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 To demonstrate how this risk model can be used to determine 
potential for success, Figure 13 focuses on the 1448 4B project and compares 
its percentage for failure against the ‘Ideal’ project. The graph’s X-axis starts 
at mean value for the ‘Ideal’ project, with any shift to the right considered an 
increase in the percentage for failure. 
 
Figure 17 - 1448 4B vs. Ideal - Percentage for success 
 
 The failure probability for both 1448 4B and ‘Ideal’, with normal 
distributed data was calculated by:  
xyu µµµ −=    (1) 
2
22
xy
u
σσ
σ
+
=
   (2) 
 These formulas could be used in MS Excel to develop a differential 
data set for each project.  
 From the data analysis and subsequent normal distributions/bell 
curves, it can be determined that for engineering projects sitting to the right 
of the 50% success rate mark, the area under the curve is the probability of 
failure. This area is made up of the potential risk factors identified within the 
3P model. Figure 14 indicates the probability of failure (area under the bell 
curve) for task 1448 4B. The mean value of project 1448 4B is 69%, which 
is indicated by the calculation: 50 – (69 – 50) = 31. It is within this area that 
risk factors relating to the development of the new phased array radar, 
technical expertise, installation concerns, etc. reside. 
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x values
Difference
Total area = probability of 
1448 4B project worse off 
than Ideal in the difference 
distribution
 
Figure 18 - Probability of failure of 1448 4B 
 
Conclusion 
 For organisations like BAE Systems, large, complex and challenging 
projects throw up a myriad of potential risks, and developing an 
understanding of these risks, their implications and how they can either be 
managed or mitigated can often be the difference between success and 
failure. Without a clear understanding of the risk profile the business will be 
carrying, project managers and engineers critically lack both direction and 
knowledge to execute tasks. The objective of this research is to develop a 
risk model that not only identifies the risks but also crucially allows 
managers and engineers to visualise the risks and manage them throughout 
the life cycle of the project. 
 The initial risk model developed in this research provides a bell curve 
which offers a risk profile of the project for comparison with the established 
benchmark or ‘Ideal’ project. This risk profile leads to a graphical 
representation of the risk the task is carrying and the predicted percentage for 
success. The graphical interface could also offer visualisation of the 3P 
model categories to potential define/indicate where the main risks primarily 
reside. 
 The initial data analysis and early development of a risk model, based 
on the data sets generated from the survey, offers some interesting results. It 
is essential to acknowledge that the research scope was limited to only three 
projects, and clearly lacks enough data to be considered comprehensive. Due 
to the diversity of projects across organisations such as BAE Systems, there 
will always be some risks that are unique to that specific project. However, 
there are also many risk factors that are ubiquitous to all projects which vary 
in their significance and can be used to develop a risk profile baseline.  
 The risks developed and used in the survey constitute the model’s 
baseline risks which are by no means fully defined or exhaustive. Further 
development of this work could be a proposed interface for the risk model, 
such as an internet browser, would allow project managers and/or engineers 
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to apply a risk severity to these baseline risks. It is essential that this 
interface is quick and friendly to use, to ensure it encourages and meets the 
expectations of the users. Time consuming complex interfaces put users off 
and result in poor data entry and meaningless results. 
 By developing a survey based on some fairly generic risks, and 
applying it to three well understood projects, the model has offered a method 
of generating quantifiable data. Of the three projects chosen, one has been 
completed and was considered successful (a baseline), one was considered 
fairly mainstream and the third was considered challenging and risky. The 
early stages of a risk model was developed to compare the risk profile of 
these three projects and the initial results look promising. An attempt to 
identify an ideal project was proposed and a 50% success rate was set. This 
was used to compare the other projects against and determined a percentage 
of success value. While the results appear to follow the perceived nature of 
the three projects, the risk model is by no means conclusive as a data set of 
three projects is clearly inadequate and further work is required.  
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